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Abstract
We present a new model of multi-product ￿rms (MPFs) and ￿ exible manufacturing and explore its
implications in partial and general equilibrium. International trade integration a⁄ects the scale and
scope of MPFs through a competition e⁄ect and a demand e⁄ect. We demonstrate how MPFs adjust in
the presence of single-product ￿rms and in heterogeneous industries. Our results are in line with recent
empirical evidence and suggest that MPFs in conjunction with ￿ exible manufacturing play an important
role in the impact of international trade on product diversity.
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Multi-product ￿rms are omnipresent in the modern world economy, especially in technologically advanced
countries. Their importance is documented in a recent study of U.S. ￿rms by Bernard, Redding and Schott
(2006).1 This shows that multi-product ￿rms are present in all industries; they typically coexist with single-
product ￿rms, accounting for less than half (41%) of the total number of ￿rms but a much greater fraction
(91%) of total output; and they are very active in varying their product mix: 89% of multi-product ￿rms
do so on average every ￿ve years. Yet, despite this empirical importance, and despite the interest in trade
as a source of increased product diversity, multi-product ￿rms have received relatively little attention in the
theory of international trade.
General equilibrium models of international trade typically rely on single-product ￿rms only. In such a
framework, intra-￿rm adjustments are limited to changes in the scale of production. Changes in diversity are
linked exclusively to changes in the number of ￿rms. In contrast to the theory of international trade, multi-
product ￿rms have received more attention in the ￿eld of industrial organization (Brander and Eaton (1984),
Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), Hallak (2000), Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001), Johnson and Myatt (2003a,
2003b), Grossmann (2003), Baldwin and Gu (2005), Allanson and Montagna (2005)). These studies have
emphasized that, because of supply and demand linkages, intra-￿rm adjustments within multi-product ￿rms
are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from adjustments via exit and entry. However, studies in industrial organization
are commonly conducted in partial equilibrium, so that they cannot capture feedback e⁄ects through factor
markets.2 But given the omnipresence and empirical importance of multi-product ￿rms across industries,
these general equilibrium e⁄ects can be signi￿cant and should be included in an analysis of multi-product
￿rms in the global economy. In this paper, we develop a new model of multi-product ￿rms that incorporates
both supply and demand linkages and explore its implications in partial and general equilibrium. Our ￿ndings
show that intra-￿rm adjustments imply quite di⁄erent predictions regarding the impact of international trade
on factor prices and product diversity than traditional models of international trade.
The supply and demand linkages in our framework capture important di⁄erences between multi-product
and single-product ￿rms, which have been highlighted in the theory of industrial organization but largely
neglected in the literature on international trade. First, in contrast to single-product ￿rms, multi-product
￿rms internalize demand linkages between the varieties they produce. This feature is called the ￿cannibal-
ization e⁄ect￿and it is generally considered as a de￿ning feature of multi-product ￿rms. The existence of a
1This uses a longitudinal database derived from the U.S. Census of Manufactures with observations at ￿ve-yearly intervals
between 1972 and 1997. Over 140,000 surviving ￿rms are present in each census year. In this study a ￿product￿is de￿ned at
the ￿ve-digit Standard Industry Classi￿cation (SIC) level.
2Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) allow for labour market equilibrium in their framework, but since they use quasi-linear
preferences, they cannot address income e⁄ects. The same point applies to Hallak (2000) and Baldwin and Gu (2005), who use
the Ottaviano and Thisse approach.
1cannibalization e⁄ect requires that ￿rms are large in their markets and behave like oligopolists. It gives rise
to strategic interactions that are of particular importance for a ￿rm￿ s reaction to changes in competition.
Second, the varieties within a ￿rm￿ s product line are linked on the cost side through a ￿ exible manufactur-
ing technology (Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Eaton and Schmitt (1994), Norman and Thisse (1999), Eckel
(2005)). Flexible manufacturing emphasizes the fact that ￿rms typically possess a ￿core competence￿in the
production of a particular variety and that they are less e¢ cient in the production of varieties outside their
core competence. In our framework, this ine¢ ciency translates into higher marginal labor requirements.
Hence, ￿ exible manufacturing allows ￿rms to expand their product lines, but this expansion is subject to
diseconomies of scope and creates cost heterogeneities within these product lines. These cost heterogeneities
are important for the general equilibrium e⁄ects of changes in product ranges. The two types of linkages,
cannibalization and ￿ exible manufacturing, are the driving forces behind the intra-￿rm adjustments in our
framework.
The type of cost linkages and the existence of demand linkages and cannibalization distinguishes our
work from recent papers by Allanson and Montagna (2005), Bernard, Redding and Schott (2005) and Nocke
and Yeaple (2005). Allanson and Montagna assume both ￿rm- and variety-speci￿c ￿xed costs; Bernard,
Redding and Schott develop a model where the ￿xed costs of production vary with the product range of
multi-product ￿rms; and Nocke and Yeaple assume that unit costs of all products are positively related
to the range of products produced. Even more signi￿cantly, all three papers analyze multi-product ￿rms
in models of ￿large-group￿monopolistic competition. In such a framework, demand linkages and strategic
behaviour are excluded, making it impossible to address the issue of cannibalization.
This paper addresses the role of adjustment processes within multi-product ￿rms and linkages with
factor and goods markets in a global economy. In particular, we analyze how multi-product ￿rms react to
di⁄erent globalization shocks (both higher foreign productivity and greater international market integration),
how these intra-￿rm adjustments a⁄ect the demand for labour, and how induced changes in wages a⁄ect
the optimal product range and the distribution of outputs within a ￿rm￿ s product range. Furthermore,
we extend our framework to allow for heterogeneous industries and illustrate how global shocks can have
asymmetric e⁄ects on multi-product ￿rms in di⁄erent industries. In order to isolate adjustments within
￿rms from adjustment via exit and entry, we focus on oligopolistic markets where barriers to entry are
prohibitively high and the number of ￿rms is exogenously given. Our analysis provides plausible explanations
for observable facts about multi-product ￿rms and presents testable propositions with respect to the impact
of economy-wide shocks on the scale and scope of multi-product ￿rms.
22 Scale and Scope of Multi-Product Firms
We begin by considering the behaviour of consumers and multi-product ￿rms in a single industry. In Section
4 we will look at the consumers￿optimization problem in detail. For now we assume that preferences exhibit
symmetric horizontal product di⁄erentiation, and give rise to a linear inverse demand function for each good
or variety:
pj (i) = a0 ￿ b0 [(1 ￿ e)xj (i) + eY ]. (1)
Here, pj (i) and xj (i) denote the price of good i and its quantity produced by ￿rm j, and Y =
R N
0 x(i)di
denotes the output of the entire industry. The total mass of di⁄erentiated goods is given by N. The
parameters a0, b0 and e denote the consumers￿maximum willingness to pay, the inverse market size and the
inverse degree of product di⁄erentiation respectively. The primes attached to a0 and b0 are a reminder that
these parameters, taken as given by ￿rms, are endogenous in general equilibrium, as will be explained in
Section 4. If e = 1, the goods are homogeneous (perfect substitutes) so that demand depends on aggregate
output only. On the other hand, e = 0 describes the monopoly case where the demand for each good is
completely independent of other goods.
Each multi-product ￿rm produces a mass of products which is denoted by ￿j. Pro￿ts for a multi-product




[pj (i) ￿ cj (i)]xj (i)di, (2)
where cj (i) denotes the marginal cost of producing good i. This is constant with respect to the quantity
produced, but varies between varieties.
As explained in the introduction, the technology of multi-product ￿rms can be characterized by a core
competence and ￿ exible manufacturing. We assume that each ￿rm has a core competence in producing a
particular variety, which describes the production process at which the ￿rm is most e¢ cient, i.e. where it
exhibits the lowest marginal production costs. We set a ￿rm￿ s core competence at i = 0 with cj (0) = c0
j and
c0
j < cj (i) 8 i > 0. In addition to producing its core competence variety, the ￿rm can add new products
to its product line via ￿ exible manufacturing. This describes a ￿rm￿ s ability to produce additional varieties
with only a minimum of adaptation. However, some adaptation is necessary, so each addition to the product
line incurs a higher marginal production cost but leaves the marginal production costs of existing products
unchanged. Marginal production costs for variety i are therefore an increasing function of the mass of
products produced:
@cj(i)
@i > 0. Furthermore, we assume that the increase in marginal production costs is




Firms simultaneously choose the quantity produced of each good and the mass of products produced.
3The ￿rst-order condition with respect to the scale of production of a particular good i is given by
@￿j
@xj (i)
= pj (i) ￿ cj (i) ￿ b0 [(1 ￿ e)xj (i) + eXj] = 0, (3)
where Xj =
R ￿j





@xj(i) ￿b0 (1 ￿ e)￿b0e
@Xj
@xj(i) < 0. Eliminating the price from equations (1) and (3) gives the output
of a single variety:3
2b0 (1 ￿ e)xj (i) = a0 ￿ cj (i) ￿ b0e(Xj + Y ). (4)
Equation (4) re￿ ects the cannibalization e⁄ect discussed in the introduction. Because a larger output of one
variety tends to lower the demand for all other varieties, a multi-product ￿rm has an additional incentive to
restrict its output of each variety beyond the familiar own-price e⁄ect. This is shown in equation (4) by the
fact that the output of a single variety is decreasing in the aggregate size of the ￿rm:
@xj(i)
@Xj = ￿e=2(1 ￿ e) <
0. The e⁄ect is also illustrated in Figure 1. Because of the cannibalization e⁄ect, the marginal revenue curve
is lower than it would be for a single-product ￿rm, so other things equal a multi-product ￿rm produces less
of each good.
Consider next the ￿rm￿ s choice of product line. Multi-product ￿rms add new products as long as marginal
pro￿ts are positive. The ￿rst-order condition with respect to the scope of production is then:
@￿j
@￿j
= [pj (￿j) ￿ cj (￿j)]xj (￿j) = 0. (5)
As
@cj(￿j)
@￿j > 0 and, thus,
@xj(￿j)
@￿j = ￿ 1
2b0(1￿e)
@cj(￿j)





= [pj (￿j) ￿ cj (￿j)]
@xj(￿j)
@￿j < 0. From (3), pj (￿j) ￿ cj (￿j) cannot be zero. Equation (5) therefore
implies that pro￿t-maximizing multi-product ￿rms choose their product range so that the output of the
marginal variety is zero: xj (￿j) = 0. Combining this with equation (4), the ￿rst-order condition with
respect to scope can also be expressed as
cj (￿j) = a0 ￿ b0e(Xj + Y ). (6)
The determination of the pro￿t-maximizing product range is illustrated in Figure 2. The ￿rm￿ s marginal
cost of production is lowest for its core competence and rises at an increasing rate as it expands its product
line. The ￿rm will add new varieties up to the point where the marginal cost of producing the marginal
3Alternatively we can solve for the price of each variety: 2pj (i) = a0 + cj (i) + b0e(Xj ￿ Y ). The ￿rm charges higher prices
for products that are further from its core competence, by contrast with models where economies of scope arise from ￿xed costs,
or where producing more varieties raises marginal costs for all varieties, as in Nocke and Yeaple (2005).
4variety equals the marginal revenue at zero output.4
The cannibalization e⁄ect not only a⁄ects the scale of production, it also in￿ uences the scope of produc-
tion. Total di⁄erentiation of (6) shows that
@￿j
@Xj = ￿ b
0e
@cj(￿j)=@￿j < 0. Because ￿rms internalize the impact
of one variety￿ s output on the demand for all of their varieties, they not only produce less of each product,
they also produce fewer products.
Taken together, the two ￿rst-order conditions provide a nice expression for the output of a single variety.
Substitute (6) into (4) to obtain:
2b0 (1 ￿ e)xj (i) = cj (￿j) ￿ cj (i). (7)
Equation (7) expresses the output of a single variety in terms of the di⁄erence in marginal costs between
this variety and the marginal variety. It also shows that if preferences (b0 and e) and technology (fcj (i)g)







Integrating (7) over the entire mass of products produced yields
2b0 (1 ￿ e)Xj = Aj (￿j), (8)
where Aj (￿j) = ￿jcj (￿j) ￿
R ￿j




@￿j > 0. Aj (￿j) measures the total cost savings
from ￿ exible manufacturing and is represented by the shaded region in Figure 2. This summarizes the impact
of the ￿rm￿ s technology on its total output. Equation (8) provides an expression for the output of ￿rm j as
a function of its product range ￿j.
The ￿rst-order condition for scope implies, from (6), that higher ￿rm output encourages a fall in product
range because of the cannibalization e⁄ect. The ￿rst-order conditions for scale and scope combined imply,
from (8), that an increase in product range encourages an increase in ￿rm output. Taken together, these two
equations jointly determine scale and scope, Xj and ￿j, for given industry output Y . They can be combined




Aj (￿j) = a0 ￿ b0eY (9)






@e < 0, and
@￿j
@Y < 0. Pro￿t-maximizing multi-product ￿rms broaden their product range
4Combining (6) with footnote 3, we see that the price charged for the marginal variety is pj (￿j) = a0 ￿ b0eY , which from
(1) is just su¢ cient to induce zero demand.
5if demand for their products increases (a0 rises or b0 falls) and reduce it if competition intensi￿es (e or Y
rises). In addition, the product range also depends on the exact location and shape of the marginal cost
curve. It is clear from Figure 2 that the product range contracts if the core competence marginal production
cost cj (0) rises (for a given shape of the cj (i) curve) or if the cj (i) curve becomes more convex (for a given
cj (0)). More complex shifts in the cost schedule (for example, if more ￿ exible manufacturing requires an
increase in the core competence cost) have ambiguous e⁄ects on ￿j. Lemma 1 summarizes the determinants
of the pro￿t maximizing product range:









While all of these determinants are exogenous to an individual ￿rm, they are a⁄ected by changes in the
industry or in the economy. In partial equilibrium, industry output is endogenous, and in general equilibrium,
a0, b0 and fcj (i)g are also endogenous. In the next section we show how industry output is determined and
in the following sections we show how demand and cost parameters are determined in general equilibrium.
3 Partial Equilibrium
The market structure in a typical industry is characterized by a heterogeneous Cournot oligopoly where
multi-product ￿rms and single-product ￿rms compete side by side. Since we wish to focus on intra-￿rm
adjustments as opposed to adjustments via exit and entry, we assume that both the number of multi-
product ￿rms m and the number of single-product ￿rms n are exogenously given. Assuming for simplicity




Xj + nxs, (11)
where xs is the output of a single-product ￿rm.5 Single-product ￿rms face the same demand function (1)
and are subject to constant marginal production costs cs. Hence, their output is given by
b0 (2 ￿ e)xs = a0 ￿ cs ￿ b0eY . (12)
5It may seem strange to add the output of a ￿nite number of single-product ￿rms to that of the multi-product ￿rms, each
of which produces a continuum of products. However, this poses no problems since the total output of each multi-product
￿rm, X, is itself ￿nite. It may be helpful to think of the single-product ￿rms as producing a continuum of identical products
along the unit interval. Because their output is homogeneous, equation (12) is identical to the output of a single variety of a
multi-product ￿rm, equation (4), in the special case where xj (i) = Xj.
6Naturally, there is no cannibalization e⁄ect for single-product ￿rms, so equation (12) is independent of X.









where ￿ ￿ 1 + e
2￿en. Equation (13) expresses the industry￿ s output for a given product range ￿. Naturally,












Equation (9), which gives the product range of each multi-product ￿rm for a given industry output, and
equation (13), which gives industry output for given product ranges, yield m+1 equations in ￿j and Y that
allow us to solve the partial equilibrium. To get some intuition for the workings of the model, we begin
with the case where all multi-product ￿rms are identical, so there are just two equations in ￿ and Y . The
equilibrium in that case can be illustrated in (￿;Y ) space as in Figure 3. From equation (9), an increase in
industry output Y implies an increase in the competition facing each multi-product ￿rm, so product range
￿ contracts and the curve labeled ScopejMPF is downward-sloping. By contrast, from equation (13), an
increase in the product range of every multi-product ￿rm implies an increase in industry output Y , so the
curve labeled IEjPE is upward-sloping.
Figure 3 provides some quick comparative static results. Changes in the number of ￿rms (m and n) and
changes in the marginal production costs of single-product ￿rms (cs) shift the IEjPE curve but leave the
ScopejMPF curve una⁄ected. Hence, @Y
@m; @Y
@n; @Y
￿@cs > 0 and @￿
@m; @￿
@n; @￿
￿@cs < 0. These shocks are pure supply
shocks that either increase competition directly via an increase in the number of competitors (m, n rises) or
indirectly via an increase in the competitiveness of the competitors (cs falls). On the other hand, a change
in the market size parameter b0 shifts both curves rightwards or leftwards to an identical extent, so that
@Y
@b0 = ￿Y
b0 < 0 and @￿
@b0 = 0. Hence, an increase in the size of the market (a fall in b) has no impact on the
product range of multi-product ￿rms, with the full adjustment borne by equiproportionate increases in the







b0 ). Finally, the impact of changes in a0 and e on the product
range ￿ are the same as the impacts laid out in lemma 1: @￿
@a0 > 0 and @￿
@e < 0.
When multi-product ￿rms are heterogeneous, these results continue to hold qualitatively for the e⁄ects
of exogenous shocks on industry output and on the product ranges of all multi-product ￿rms.6 In addition,
we can compare the responses of di⁄erent multi-product ￿rms. The relative responses of the product ranges
of any two multi-product ￿rms j and h to changes in n, cs or a0 are given by:
6Strictly speaking, we cannot use calculus to determine the e⁄ects of entry by a new multi-product ￿rm on the equilibrium.


















Here ’j is an increasing concave function of the product range ￿j, while ￿j is the inverse semi-elasticity of
marginal cost, evaluated at the marginal variety, and so can be interpreted as a measure of ￿rm j￿ s ￿ exibility
in manufacturing. Equation (14) shows that ￿rms with longer product lines (for a given ￿ exibility) and with
more ￿ exible technology at the margin (for a given length of product line) tend to respond more to shocks.
The former result is consistent with the empirical ￿nding of Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006) that larger
￿rms are more active in changing their product mix.
These results can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 1 In partial equilibrium, an increase in competition reduces the product range ￿j of all multi-
product ￿rms and raises industry output Y . An increase in the size of the market also leads to an increase in
industry output Y but leaves the product ranges ￿j una⁄ected. Multi-product ￿rms with longer product lines
and with more ￿exible technology tend to respond more to shocks.
From a welfare perspective, the impact on the product range of individual ￿rms is not as important
as the impact on the overall diversity of products o⁄ered. The total number of varieties in the market is
given by N =
Pm
j=1 ￿j + n. If m and n stay constant, the changes in product ranges determine the change
in diversity: dN =
Pm
j=1 d￿j. However, if the number of ￿rms changes, the impact on diversity consists
of two e⁄ects: a direct e⁄ect through the change in the number of ￿rms and an indirect e⁄ect through
induced adjustments of the product range. As product range is decreasing in n, and also in m when ￿rms
are homogeneous ( @￿
@m; @￿
@n < 0), these two e⁄ects work in opposite directions so that the overall impact on
diversity is ambiguous. This is an important observation because it highlights a major di⁄erence between our
framework and models of international trade with only single-product ￿rms. In the latter case, an increase
in the number of ￿rms always increases diversity because, by de￿nition, these models cannot take account
of adjustments in the product range. In our framework we see that changes in the product range are an
important margin of adjustment that has a non-trivial impact on diversity.
Given (9) and (13), the impact of a change in the number of single-product ￿rms n on industry diversity
N is given by:7

















Here ￿ is a weighted average of the ￿ exibilities of all m multi-product ￿rms, where the weights "j=" are larger
for ￿rms with longer product lines. When multi-product ￿rms are homogeneous they all have ￿ exibility ￿.






Clearly both derivatives can become negative if ￿ is su¢ ciently large: @N
@n < 0 if ￿ > ￿
0
b0exs and @N
@m < 0 if
￿ > ￿￿
0
b0eX. Hence, ￿ is an important determinant of the change in diversity. If ￿ exibility as measured by ￿
is low, changes in the product range lead to large cost e⁄ects. Hence adjustments take place primarily via
adjustments of output levels and less via changes in the product range. Traditional trade models correspond
to the extreme case where ￿ is zero. On the other hand, if ￿ is high, changes in the product range lead to
only small cost e⁄ects. In this case, adjustments take place primarily via changes in the product range, and
the entry of either type of ￿rm can reduce diversity. Summarizing:
Proposition 2 In partial equilibrium, the impact of changes in the number of ￿rms on diversity depends
on the degree of ￿exibility in manufacturing. If ￿exibility is low, diversity rises when the number of ￿rms
increases, otherwise diversity falls.
4 General Equilibrium
We now turn to the level of the economy as a whole, extending the model of general oligopolistic equilibrium
(GOLE) set out in Neary (2002) to allow for multi-product ￿rms. We assume that the world economy consists
of a continuum of industries, each of which has an oligopolistic market structure, and a ￿nite number of
countries, all with fully integrated goods markets but no international factor mobility.
Each consumer maximizes a two-tier utility function that depends on their consumption levels q (i;z) of
all N (z) goods produced in each industry z, where z varies over the interval [0;1]. The upper tier is an
additive function of a continuum of sub-utility functions, each corresponding to one industry:
U hu[q (0;z);:::;q fN (z);zg]i =
Z 1
0
u[q (0;z);:::;q fN (z);zg]dz. (18)
9Each sub-utility function in turn is quadratic:




















The utility parameters a, b and e are assumed to be identical for all consumers. Consumers maximize utility





p(i;z)q (i;z)didz ￿ I, (20)
where I denotes individual income. This leads to the following individual inverse demand functions:




The parameter ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier, which denotes the consumer￿ s marginal utility of income.
To move from individual to aggregate demands, we assume that there are L consumers located in the
home country, and L￿ consumers in each of k identical foreign countries.8 In spite of the di⁄erences in
nationalities, all consumers (domestic and foreign) have identical preferences. However, as incomes may
di⁄er between countries, they may have di⁄erent consumption levels and, thus, di⁄erent marginal utilities of
income. Because the goods markets of all countries are completely integrated in a single world market and
free trade prevails, the price of a given variety is the same everywhere. Therefore, the market demand for
a particular variety i in industry z, x(i;z), facing a ￿rm in any country consists of demand from domestic
consumers, Lq (i;z), plus demand from foreign consumers, kL￿q￿ (i;z). The inverse world market demand
function for good i in industry z can then be written exactly as in (1):
















The parameter ￿ ￿ is a population-weighted average of the home and foreign marginal utilities of income and so
can be interpreted as the average world marginal utility of income. Because they depend on ￿ ￿, the parameters
8Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk throughout.
10a0 and b0 are endogenously determined in general equilibrium. However, with a continuum of industries they
are perceived as exogenous by individual ￿rms. Hence ￿rms are ￿large￿in their own market but ￿small￿in
the economy as a whole, which permits a consistent analysis of oligopoly in general equilibrium. (See Neary
(2002) for details.)
Turning to production, we assume a Ricardian technology with labour as the only factor of production.
For tractability, we also assume from now on that ￿rms are homogeneous within each sector, so we can
suppress the j subscript. The marginal production costs c(i;z) of each multi-product ￿rm can therefore be
decomposed into marginal labor requirements ￿ (i;z) and the economy-wide wage rate w:
c(i;z) = w￿ (i;z). (25)
The ￿ exible manufacturing features of the cost function, a core competence and increasing convex marginal





@i2 > 0. The marginal production costs of single-product ￿rms at home and abroad are simply
cs (z) = w￿s (z) and c￿ (z) = w￿￿￿ (z). It is convenient to de￿ne real wages at home and abroad W and W￿
not in units of a particular good or a basket of some kind, but in terms of utils at the margin. Thus, the
nominal wage is weighted by the average marginal utility ￿ ￿:
W = w￿ ￿ W￿ = w￿￿ ￿. (26)
Labor markets are perfectly competitive and fully integrated within each country, so the wage rate is the
same for all ￿rms and all industries within each country. However, there is no international labor mobility
so national labor markets are segmented. The labor demand of a multi-product ￿rm in industry z consists






The labor demand of a single-product ￿rm in industry z is simply lD
SPF (z) = ￿s (z)xs (z). Labor market





MPF (z) + n(z)lD
SPF (z)
￿
dz = L. (28)
In principle, the same holds for the foreign labor market. However, we assume that multi-product
￿rms are located in the home country only. First and foremost, this assumption is a simpli￿cation that
11allows us to concentrate on the home country for adjustments within multi-product ￿rms. Once these
adjustments are understood, extending multi-product ￿rms to all countries is just a technicality. Secondly,
this assumption introduces an asymmetry between countries that allows us to interpret the home country as
a fully industrialized country and the foreign countries as developing countries or emerging market economies
that are not yet advanced enough to implement ￿ exible manufacturing technologies. Hence, foreign labor
market equilibrium is given by
Z 1
0
n￿ (z)￿￿ (z)x￿ (z)dz = L￿. (29)
We can now set out the full description of an equilibrium in the world economy. Given equations (23),
(25) and (26), the ￿rst-order condition for scale, equation (6), can be rewritten as
be[X (z) + Y (z)] = [a ￿ W￿ (￿;z)](L + kL￿) (30)
and that for scale and scope combined, equation (8), can be rewritten as
2b(1 ￿ e)X (z) = W￿(￿;z)(L + kL￿), (31)
where ￿(￿;z) ￿ ￿ (z)￿ (￿;z) ￿
R ￿(z)
0 ￿ (i;z)di, the real component of the total cost savings from ￿ exible
manufacturing A(￿;z). The output of domestic and foreign single-product ￿rms can now be expressed as
b(2 ￿ e)xs (z) = [a ￿ W￿s (z)](L + kL￿) ￿ beY (z) (32)
and
b(2 ￿ e)x￿ (z) = [a ￿ W￿￿￿ (z)](L + kL￿) ￿ beY (z). (33)
The expression for industry output takes into account that there are domestic and foreign single-product
￿rms:
Y (z) = m(z)X (z) + n(z)xs (z) + kn￿ (z)x￿ (z). (34)
Equations (30) to (34) can be solved for ￿ (z), X (z), xs (z), x￿ (z) and Y (z) for each industry z for given
values of the two economy-wide real wage rates W and W￿. The two labor market clearing conditions (28)
and (29) then provide the ￿nal two equations.
125 Globalization with Symmetric Industries
Our general setup allows for two di⁄erent types of heterogeneities: heterogenous ￿rms (multi-product and
single-product ￿rms) and heterogenous industries. To simplify the analysis we look at one heterogeneity at
a time. In this section, we assume that all industries are identical, while in the next section we consider the
case where industries are heterogeneous but have only one kind of ￿rm. We ￿rst illustrate the determination
of equilibrium, and then show how it is a⁄ected by two globalization shocks: an increase in the productivity
of foreign ￿rms located in emerging market economies (a reduction in ￿￿) and an increase in the number of
countries participating in the world market (k).
5.1 Equilibrium
When all industries are symmetric, the index z can be omitted. In this case, the full general equilibrium
can be described by only four equations. First, equations (30) and (31) can be combined and the output of













This equation is the general equilibrium equivalent of (9). It determines ￿, the product range of a typical
multi-product ￿rm, for given Y and W. Next, we can use equations (29), (31) and (32) to eliminate ￿rm











(L + kL￿) +
kL￿
￿￿ , (36)
where ￿ ￿ 1 + e
2￿en as before. Equation (36) is the general equilibrium equivalent of (13). It determines
industry output Y for given ￿ and W.
The remaining two equations give the conditions for labor-market equilibrium at home and abroad. Using







n￿s (a ￿ W￿s)
2 ￿ e
￿
(L + kL￿) =
e
2 ￿ e
n￿sY + L, (37)
where ￿ (￿) ￿
R ￿
0 ￿ (i)[￿ (￿) ￿ ￿ (i)]di measures the average labor requirement of a multi-product ￿rm, cor-




X . Naturally, the domestic labor
market clearing condition determines W for given ￿ and Y . Finally, the foreign labor market equilibrium














This determines the foreign real wage W￿ as a function of Y only. Hence, we can concentrate on equations
(35) to (37) which uniquely determine the equilibrium values of the three key variables, industry output Y ,
the product range of multi-product ￿rms ￿, and the domestic real wage W, for a given number of ￿rms (m,
n, and n￿) and countries (k).
To illustrate the equilibrium diagrammatically, we can reduce the number of equations to two. Figure 4
provides explicit solutions for the two domestic variables W and ￿, with implicit solutions for Y and W￿.


















The left-hand side is increasing in ￿ and the right-hand side is decreasing in W, so the IE curve has a
negative slope.9 If W rises for a given ￿, equation (35) implies that competition (Y ) falls. This tends to
boost outputs (both X and xs rise)10. In this case, restoring industry equilibrium requires that ￿ falls, thus
the negative slope of the IE curve.
The LL contour describes the labor market equilibrium in (W;￿) space. It is derived by substituting Y












W (L + kL￿)
. (40)
The slope of the LL curve is also negative. Again, equation (35) implies that if W rises, competition (Y )
falls for a given ￿. The implicit increase in outputs creates an excess demand for labor. Hence, labor market
clearing also requires that ￿ falls. We show in the appendix that the LL curve must be steeper than the IE
curve. Hence the intersection of the two curves as illustrated in Figure 4 determines the domestic real wage
W and the product range of multi-product ￿rms ￿ in a global general equilibrium.
9See the Appendix for a formal proof.
10Equations (30) to (32) imply X = W￿(￿) L+kL￿
2b(1￿e) and xs = W
h




b(2￿e) , so that for a given ￿,
@X
@W > 0 and @xs
@W > 0.
145.2 An Increase in Foreign Productivity
Having established the general equilibrium we can now turn to the comparative statics of globalization. We
begin with an increase in the productivity of foreign ￿rms (a fall in ￿￿). This is a pure competition shock
which from equations (39) and (40) shifts the IE curve inwards, but leaves the LL curve una⁄ected. As
Figure 5 shows, this leads to a fall in the domestic wage and a rise in the product range of multi-product
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￿ (￿) + n￿s￿
> 0, (43)
Here the determinant of the equation system ￿ is positive,11 and, as in Section 3, ’ ￿
(2￿e)￿
2(1￿e)+e￿ and
￿ ￿ [￿￿￿ (￿)]
￿1, with the latter measuring the ￿ exibility of production by multi-product ￿rms. We have
expressed ￿(￿) and ￿ (￿) in terms of the ￿rst and second moments of the distribution of ￿ (i). De￿ne
the ￿rst moment about zero (the mean) as ￿0
￿ (￿) ￿ 1
￿
R ￿
0 ￿ (i)di and the second moment about zero as
￿00




2 di. Then, ￿(￿) = ￿
￿
￿ (￿) ￿ ￿0
￿ (￿)
￿
and ￿ (￿) = ￿
￿
￿ (￿)￿0
￿ (￿) ￿ ￿00
￿ (￿)
￿
. The variance of
￿ (i) is then given by ￿2
￿ (￿) = ￿00
￿ (￿) ￿ ￿0
￿ (￿)
2. Summarizing:
Proposition 3 With symmetric industries, an increase in the productivity of foreign ￿rms (a fall in ￿￿)
raises industry output, increases the product range of multi-product ￿rms and lowers the domestic real wage.
The increase in foreign productivity raises the output of foreign ￿rms [dx￿=d￿￿ = ￿L￿=n￿ (￿￿)
2 < 0],
which encourages an increase in industry output. The outputs of domestic ￿rms tend to contract as a
consequence of the increase in competition from abroad, but the direct e⁄ect on industry output dominates.
However, the incipient decrease in domestic output lowers demand for labor at home, so that the wage rate
falls [equation (43)]. Moreover this fall in the wage is su¢ cient to o⁄set the contractionary e⁄ect of the
increase in competition on the product range of multi-product ￿rms. (Recall equation (35) which shows that
changes in Y and W have opposite e⁄ects on ￿.) Figure 5 and equation (42) show that the e⁄ect of the
decrease in the wage rate dominates so that the product range of multi-product ￿rms rises.
11￿ = f(2 ￿ e) + e(’m + n)gm￿￿2
￿ (￿) + 2(1 ￿ e)
hn
’m￿0









15The increase in foreign competition can be compared to an increase in the competitiveness of single-
product ￿rms (a fall in cs) in the partial equilibrium analysis of Section 3. The shocks are similar but the
general equilibrium result presented here di⁄ers substantially from the partial equilibrium result. While
industry output rises in both cases, the product range of multi-product ￿rms falls in partial equilibrium but
rises in general equilibrium. The di⁄erence between these two ￿ndings is due to the missing wage e⁄ect in the
partial equilibrium analysis. In partial equilibrium, the wage rate remains constant, so from (35) changes
in the product range are determined entirely by changes in competition (Y ). Hence, the product range
falls. But in general equilibrium, the decrease in domestic labor demand brought about by an increase in
foreign competition lowers the wage rate. The associated cut in costs allows multi-product ￿rms to expand
their product range. This di⁄erence in adjustments between partial and general equilibrium is illustrated in
Figure 5. The partial equilibrium e⁄ect is shown by the fall in the product range to ￿
PE for a given W. By
contrast, in general equilibrium the fall in the wage rate encourages a rise in the product range to ￿
GE.
Although the product range of multi-product ￿rms expands, it does not follow that the output of each
variety must rise. Since the unit labor requirements of the various products produced are di⁄erent, the
absolute cost reductions induced by a fall in the wage rate also di⁄er across products. These cost reductions
are highest for the marginal product (the one with the highest unit labor requirement) and smallest for the








￿ (￿) + n￿s￿
(￿￿)
2 [￿ ￿ (￿) ￿ ￿ (i)] T 0, (44)


















￿s. Equation (44) shows that whether the output of an individual variety rises or falls depends on its unit
labor requirement ￿ (i). The output of the marginal product, with unit labour requirement ￿ (￿), must rise
since the product range expands. (Output x(￿) is initially zero and increases as ￿ rises.) As for the core
competence variety, if ￿0 is su¢ ciently low (so that ￿0 < ￿ ￿ (￿)), its output x(0) falls. In this case, the
outputs of di⁄erent varieties produced by a single multi-product ￿rm move in di⁄erent directions, with the
outputs of products close to the ￿core￿of a ￿rm￿ s product range falling while varieties closer to the margin
expand. Even if the outputs of all varieties increase, di⁄erentiating (44) with respect to i shows that a fall















16Hence, because of the ￿ exible manufacturing technology (which implies that marginal costs ￿ (i) increase in
i,
@￿(i)
@i > 0), the impact of a fall in ￿￿ on individual outputs is more positive (or less negative), the further
away a variety is located from the ￿rm￿ s core competence. This asymmetry is driven by the asymmetry
in unit labor requirements between products. All products are subject to the same two forces: an increase
in competition (Y rises) and a decrease in costs (W falls). The increase in competition tends to lower the
outputs of all products and the cut in costs tends to raise outputs. The former a⁄ects all products in the
same way, while the latter varies in magnitude with a product￿ s unit labor requirements, being smallest for
the core competence variety and largest for the marginal variety. It is this asymmetric sensitivity to costs
which leads to asymmetric adjustments within a ￿rm￿ s product range.
Changes in the aggregate sizes of both types of ￿rms depend on their mean labor requirements ￿s and
￿0











































Inspecting these equations shows that both types of ￿rms contract if they are equally e¢ cient on average
(￿0
￿ (￿) = ￿s), but that the less e¢ cient type may expand. For example, if single-product ￿rms are much
less e¢ cient (￿0
￿ (￿) << ￿s), then they gain more from the fall in wages and their output may rise following
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Proposition 4 An increase in foreign productivity ￿attens the distribution of outputs within a multi-product
￿rm￿ s product range. Products at the margin of the product range always expand while those near the core
may contract. Aggregate ￿rm outputs can also rise or fall depending on the ￿rst and second moments of the
distribution of ￿ (i), though total output of all home ￿rms must fall.
Note ￿nally that the expansion in the product range means that an increase in foreign productivity leads
to an increase in diversity (measured by N = m￿ + n + kn￿) even without ￿rm entry. However, this result
need not hold when we turn to consider the e⁄ects of international market integration in the next sub-section.
12Note that the reduction in total output by multi-product ￿rms is fully consistent with the expansion in their product range.
This is most easily seen in the special case with no single-product ￿rms (n = 0), when equation (46) reduces to (48).
175.3 International Market Integration
A di⁄erent type of globalization shock is an increase in the number of countries participating in the world
market, k. Inspecting (39) and (40) we can see that this shifts both curves inwards. Explicit solutions for
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2 ￿ e + e(’m + n)
￿￿ [￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿ (￿)] T 0. (51)





2￿e+e(’m+n) is a weighted sum of ￿0
￿ (￿) and ￿s, where the weights add to less than one.
Note that a positive value for the foreign wage in autarky requires that a￿￿ > be.13 This inequality is used
in deriving the sign of equation (50).
The results in equations (49) to (51) can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 5 With symmetric industries, international market integration raises industry output and low-
ers the product range of multi-product ￿rms. The impact on the wage is ambiguous: it rises if and only if
￿￿ > ~ ￿.
The ambiguity in the wage change arises because the increase in k a⁄ects the domestic economy through
two channels, a competition e⁄ect and a demand e⁄ect. An increase in k increases competition on the product
market because the integration of new countries into the world trading system also brings in new ￿rms. The




Primary = n￿x￿ >
0. This channel which we call the competition e⁄ect is qualitatively identical to the e⁄ect of a fall in ￿￿
considered in the previous sub-section. In addition, an increase in k increases demand for all products







= L￿ > 0. We call this channel the demand e⁄ect.
Both the competition e⁄ect and the demand e⁄ect tend to increase industry output, but they have opposing
e⁄ects on the domestic real wage W and the product range ￿. Equation (50) shows that with respect to ￿,
the demand e⁄ect dominates. But the impact on the real wage is ambiguous.
13This comes from solving the autarky equilibrium conditions in the foreign country: b(2 ￿ e)x￿ = (a ￿ W￿￿￿)L￿ ￿ beY
(where W￿ = ￿￿w￿), Y = n￿x￿, and n￿￿￿x￿ = L￿. Hence, the foreign autarky wage is W￿ = 1
(￿￿)2
￿
a￿￿ ￿ be ￿ 1
n￿ b(2 ￿ e)
￿
.
18An increase in competition reduces the market shares of domestic ￿rms and demand for domestic labor
falls. Hence, the competition e⁄ect tends to lower the domestic wage. But an increase in demand from the
newly integrated economies raises demand for labor at home, so that the demand e⁄ect tends to raise the real
































The net change in the wage depends on the relative competitiveness of domestic ￿rms vis-￿-vis foreign
￿rms. If all ￿rms have identical unit labor requirements (on average), so that ￿0
￿ (￿) = ￿s = ￿￿, then the






(L+kL￿)2 > 0. But if foreign ￿rms have relatively low unit labor
requirements, ￿￿ < ~ ￿ (￿), the competition e⁄ect dominates and the domestic real wage falls.
The competition e⁄ect and the demand e⁄ect can be illustrated separately in Figure 6. The competition
e⁄ect leads to an inward shift of the IE curve, very similar to the e⁄ects of a fall in ￿￿ in the previous
subsection (a move from point A to B). It is derived by letting kL
￿
￿￿ (= kn￿x￿) on the right-hand side of
equation (39) rise while keeping L + kL￿ constant. The demand e⁄ect is derived by letting L + kL￿ rise
while keeping kL
￿
￿￿ constant. Hence, the demand e⁄ect corresponds to a partial backward shift of the IE
curve and a shift of the LL curve to the left (a move from B to C). On aggregate, both curves are shifted
to the left and the new equilibrium is at a lower ￿, but the impact on the wage rate is ambiguous.
The diagrammatic analysis con￿rms that the impact on ￿ and W of the demand e⁄ect is exactly opposite
to that of the competition e⁄ect. Consequently, the demand e⁄ect has a di⁄erent impact on infra-marginal
outputs as well. The increase in both Y and W tends to reduce all outputs because competition and
production costs both rise. As the increase in production costs is largest for products with high unit labor
requirements, the increase in W reinforces a steeper output distribution within the product range. In
addition, an increase in the size of the world market (as implied by an increase in L + kL￿) also shifts the
marginal revenue curve outwards. This demand side expansion is a proportional shock, so it is largest for
products close to the core (with low marginal costs) and smallest for products close to the margin. In sum,
the demand e⁄ect steepens the size distribution.14
Mathematically, the impacts of an increase in k on the output of any variety and on the distribution of
14The impact of a shift in the marginal revenue curve on the distribution of x(i) is also present in partial equilibrium.





@i > 0, so that the distribution becomes steeper when b0 falls. However,
asymmetric adjustments are not possible in partial equilibrium.
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￿ (￿) + n￿s￿ @￿ (i)
@i
< 0. (54)
Again, since a￿￿ > be, the demand e⁄ect clearly dominates and the size distribution steepens when k rises.
The dominance of the demand e⁄ect on individual outputs is most obvious when dW
dk = 0. In this case,
the impact on outputs is determined solely by the interplay between the increase in competition and the
increase in marginal revenue. But even if dW
dk < 0, the e⁄ect of a lower wage is dominated by the increase in
marginal revenue in its impact on the size distribution. By analogy with our ￿ndings in the previous section,
asymmetric adjustments are possible here, too. If ￿0 < ￿ ￿ (￿),
dx(0)
dk > 0 and
dx(￿)
dk < 0. The only di⁄erence is
that in the case of international market integration, products close to the core expand while products further
























dk > 0 if ￿s > ￿0
￿ (￿).






+ n￿ T 0. (56)
The addition of new ￿rms from new countries to the world market raises the choices available to consumers
(n￿ > 0), while the dropping of products from the product ranges of existing multi-product ￿rms lowers diver-
sity (d￿=dk < 0). The overall impact on diversity depends on the ￿ exibility in multi-product manufacturing.












W (L + kL￿)
￿2 m’
n￿ , (57)
where ￿ = [￿￿￿ (￿)]￿1 is our measure of ￿ exibility. Note that there is a striking correspondence with
the corresponding partial equilibrium result in proposition 2. Again, the degree of ￿ exibility ￿ is a key
determinant of whether overall diversity rises or falls.
Proposition 6 If ￿exibility as measured by ￿ is low overall diversity rises, whereas if ￿exibility is high
overall diversity falls.
20Proposition 6 presents a result that di⁄ers fundamentally from the predictions of standard trade theory.
Because conventional workhorse models in international trade theory do not allow for multi-product ￿rms,
they cannot account for the e⁄ects of globalization on the degree of diversity within ￿rms. With single-
product ￿rms only, there is a direct correspondence between the number of ￿rms and diversity. Hence, an
increase in the number of ￿rms in the world market raises diversity by assumption. Here, however, we show
that an increase in the number of producers can lead to counteracting adjustment processes within ￿rms
that can lower overall product diversity.
6 High-Tech and Low-Tech Industries
In this section we relax our previous assumption regarding the perfect symmetry of industries. Instead, we
assume that the mass of industries can be divided into two groups: high-tech and low-tech industries. The
di⁄erence between these is that low-tech industries are subject to competition from developing countries
whereas high-tech industries are located entirely in the industrialized world. In our two-country framework
this translates into assuming that the home country possesses both types of industries whereas the foreign
country only has access to the low-tech technology and thus hosts only single-product ￿rms in this group
of industries. For simplicity, we assume that all ￿rms in the home country are multi-product ￿rms. The
interaction between single-product ￿rms and multi-product ￿rms within an industry has been described in
great detail in the previous section, so we can focus on inter-industry adjustments in this section.
Let low-tech industries be in the interval z 2 (0;￿) and high-tech industries in the interval z 2 (￿;1), so
that ￿ denotes the share of low-tech industries. Otherwise, ￿rms and consumers in all industries continue to
be symmetric. With two groups of industries in the home country there must be a set of equations for ￿rm
behavior and industry equilibrium for each group. Only the labor market equilibrium is common to both
groups. In addition, we need to adjust the labor market equilibrium for the fact that the demand for labor
can di⁄er between ￿rms in high-tech and low-tech industries.
In both low-tech (L) and high-tech (H) industries, the equilibrium product ranges of multi-product ￿rms

































(L + kL￿). (61)
where the parameters mL and mH denote the number of multi-product ￿rms in each group of industries.
Finally the model is closed by the domestic and foreign labor market equilibrium conditions:
￿mL￿ (￿L) + (1 ￿ ￿)mH￿ (￿H) =
2b(1 ￿ e)L
W (L + kL￿)
(62)
￿n￿￿￿x￿ = L￿. (63)
Labor demand at home comes from both types of industries, weighted by their shares ￿ and 1￿￿, respectively,
but labor demand abroad comes from low-tech ￿rms only, since there are no high-tech ￿rms there.
In this setup the high-tech industries are shielded from direct foreign competition, so there is no direct
competition e⁄ect. Firms in the high-tech industries are only a⁄ected indirectly through changes in the
economy-wide wage rate W. The product range of multi-product ￿rms in these high-tech industries can be
determined by eliminating Y from equations (59) and (61):
e
2(1 ￿ e)




Equation (64) provides a unique relation between the real wage W and the product range ￿H in high-tech
industries with d￿H
dW < 0. If the wage rate rises, production costs in the high-tech industries increase and
￿rms react to the cost increase by pruning their product range. Note that this relation is independent of
any foreign in￿ uences, and in particular of ￿￿ and k. It is represented by the IEHT locus in the left-hand
quadrant of Figure 7, which is negatively sloped in (W;￿H) space.
In the low-tech industries, the corresponding relationship is not independent of foreign parameters because
the low-tech industry is subject to foreign competition. Combining the two equations for those industries,
(58) and (60), shows that equilibrium depends on ￿￿ and k as well as on ￿L and W:
e
2(1 ￿ e)











This condition is illustrated by the IELT curve in the right-hand panel of Figure 7, and it exhibits very
similar features to the industry equilibrium curve (39) in the previous section. It is also negatively sloped
22and it is shifted to the left if ￿￿ falls or if k rises, with a negative competition e⁄ect outweighing a positive
demand e⁄ect in the latter case.
Finally, equation (62) describes the domestic labor market equilibrium as a function of the wage rate W
and the two product ranges ￿L and ￿H. It is most convenient to illustrate this in (W;￿L) space (again referred
to as the LL locus), since this allows us to focus on how the competition and demand e⁄ects in￿ uence the
equilibrium product range in the low-tech industries and how general equilibrium feedback e⁄ects in￿ uence
the product range in the high-tech industries. Hence, using (64) to eliminate ￿H from (62), the slope of the







(1 ￿ ￿)a~ ￿ (￿H) ￿ beL
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i, (66)




2(1￿e) and ’H ￿
2(1￿e)￿H
2(1￿e)+e(mH+1)￿H . Note that this slope depends on the share of
low-tech industries, ￿. If ￿ = 1, then equation (65) reduces to (39) with n = 0. In this case, dW
d￿L is negative
and the LL locus is downward-sloping as in Section 5 (and, as there, it must be more negatively sloped than
the IELT locus). But if ￿ is less than 1 ￿ beL
a~ ￿(￿H)(L+kL￿), then the LL locus is upward-sloping. The slope of
the LL locus in (W;￿L) space varies with ￿ because changes in ￿L have a smaller impact on labor demand
when ￿ is small than when it is large. This is most obvious in the extreme case of ￿ = 0, when changes in
￿L have no impact on labor demand, so the LL curve is vertical.
We are now ready to consider the e⁄ects of an increase in foreign productivity (a fall in ￿￿). Inspecting
equations (62), (64) and (65), only the latter is a⁄ected: the IELT curve is shifted to the left and so the
wage unambiguously falls. As a result the product range in high-tech sectors increases, since their costs have
fallen and they face no foreign competition. By contrast the change in the product range in low-tech sectors





















2 ~ ￿ (￿L) > 0, (69)
where ￿L ￿ [￿￿ (￿L)]
￿1 and ￿H ￿ [￿￿ (￿H)]
￿1 measure the ￿ exibility of production by multi-product ￿rms
in the two sectors, ’L ￿
2(1￿e)￿L
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23competition. The increase in foreign competition has a direct e⁄ect on low-tech industries only. At the
initial wage rate, this tends to lower the product range in low-tech industries and to reduce demand for
labor. The induced fall in the wage rate is an economy-wide shock, which tends to raise the product range
in all industries. On balance, the product range in high-tech industries clearly rises, but the impact on the
product range in low-tech industries is ambiguous. When ￿ is high, so the share of low-tech sectors which are
subject to foreign competition is large, the lower wage raises the product range in both sectors. This case is
qualitatively identical to that in the last section: the LL curve is downward sloping, W falls and ￿L rises.16
By contrast, if ￿ is less than 1 ￿ beL
a(L+kL￿)~ ￿(￿H), the LL curve is upward sloping as illustrated in Figure 7.
Now the increased competition faced by low-tech sectors has a relatively small impact on aggregate labor
demand at home and so the wage change is small. As a consequence, the product range falls in low-tech
sectors.
Having laid out the mechanisms driving inter-industry adjustments, the case of international market



























￿T (L + kL￿)￿￿ [￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿ (￿L)] T 0. (72)
As in the previous section, the additional demand e⁄ect pushes wages up su¢ ciently that the product range
in the low-tech industries unambiguously falls.17 However, the impact on W (and hence on ￿H) is ambiguous,
and depends on the average labor requirements in low-tech industries at home compared to the unit labor
requirements of foreign competitors, ~ ￿ (￿L) T ￿￿. (Note that it does not depend on the share of low-tech
industries ￿.) Hence, asymmetric adjustments are still possible though they arise from a di⁄erent mechanism
than in the case of a fall in ￿￿. If foreign ￿rms are su¢ ciently competitive that ￿￿ < ~ ￿ (￿L), an increase in
k leads to a fall in the wage rate, so that the product range in the high-tech industries expands. Since the
product range in the low-tech industries always contracts, multi-product ￿rms adjust di⁄erently to the same
economy-wide shock depending on the type of industry they belong to.
We can summarize the results in this section as follows:
Proposition 7 With heterogeneous industries, shocks exclusive to one industry are transmitted to other
16When ￿ equals one, the results here are quantitatively identical to those in the previous section with n = 0. Under these
assumptions the two industry equilibrium conditions, (39) and (65), and the two labour-market equilibrium conditions, (40)
and (62), are identical to one another.
17As in the corresponding condition in Section 5 (where ￿ = 1), positive foreign outputs in autarky require that ￿a￿￿ > be.
24industries via wage adjustments. Hence globalization can lead to asymmetric product range adjustments
between high-tech and low-tech industries. An increase in the competitiveness of foreign ￿rms always lowers
domestic wages, so the product range in low-tech industries is subject to con￿icting in￿uences and expands if
and only if ￿ > 1￿ beL
a~ ￿(￿H)(L+kL￿). By contrast, the demand e⁄ect of greater international market integration
leads to less pressure on wages, with the result that low-tech industries always prune their product range. High-
tech industries shielded from foreign competition expand their product range whenever domestic wages fall,
which always happens following an increase in foreign competitiveness but occurs after greater international
market integration if and only if foreign ￿rms are su¢ ciently competitive that ￿￿ < ~ ￿ (￿L).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a new model of multi-product ￿rms which highlights the role of ￿ exible
manufacturing but which is su¢ ciently tractable that it can be embedded in a model of general oligopolistic
equilibrium. Our analysis shows that the GOLE model provides a coherent framework within which the
implications of multi-product ￿rms and the associated supply and demand linkages can be addressed. Our
focus is on the intra-￿rm adjustments within multi-product ￿rms and we ￿nd that economy-wide shocks can
have a considerable impact on both the scale and scope of multi-product ￿rms. In addition, our analysis
shows that the general equilibrium feedback e⁄ects, through changes in wages and income, are an important
determinant of changes in product ranges.
Our results suggest that adjustment processes within multi-product ￿rms are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
adjustments within industries through exit and entry. Standard trade theory based on single-product ￿rms
in monopolistic competition predicts that international market integration raises the real wages of all par-
ticipating countries and unambiguously increases the choices available to consumers. While this outcome
is still possible in our framework, our results show that other outcomes are also possible depending on the
competitiveness of foreign ￿rms, on consumer preferences and on the degree of ￿ exibility in manufacturing.
First, the change in the real wage depends on whether the impact of an increase in competition from abroad
is accompanied by an increase in foreign demand, because the competition e⁄ect tends to lower the real wage
while the demand e⁄ect tends to raise it. Second, the overall change in diversity depends on the degree of
￿ exibility in manufacturing. If manufacturing technologies are highly ￿ exible, multi-product ￿rms respond
to shocks more by altering their product range than their total output, which as we have shown implies that
overall product diversity can fall when new countries enter the world market.18 These results are substan-
18This is quite consistent with the ￿ndings of Broda and Weinstein (2006) that the diversity of imports has increased as a
result of trade liberalization. Moreover, their study assumes CES preferences, which place a higher premium on diversity than
quadratic preferences.
25tially di⁄erent from the predictions of standard trade theory even though both sets of results are driven by
the same forces, an increase in the number of ￿rms and an increase in the size of the market. This di⁄erence
in predictions underlines the importance of intra-￿rm adjustments.
Furthermore, our look inside a ￿rm￿ s product range reveals new and testable insights into how infra-
marginal products adjust. Because ￿ exible manufacturing creates cost heterogeneities within ￿rms, asym-
metric adjustment processes are possible that di⁄er signi￿cantly from adjustments via exit and entry. We
show that these processes are driven to a large degree by changes in factor prices, underlining the importance
of a general equilibrium approach.
Our framework can be extended in various directions. We present an extension that analyzes the general
equilibrium feedback e⁄ects between asymmetric industries. This provides insights into how adjustments
within multi-product ￿rms can di⁄er between industries and shows that industries which are not subject
to direct foreign competition in their own markets are still a⁄ected by a competition e⁄ect through the
labor market. We also allow for heterogeneous ￿rms in our partial equilibrium analysis. Further extensions,
to allow for heterogeneous ￿rms in general equilibrium, and to consider how ￿rms choose their degree of
￿ exibility, seem well worth exploring in our framework.
Empirical evidence suggests that multi-product ￿rms are an important feature of modern industries. Our
results show that adjustment processes within multi-product ￿rms di⁄er substantially from adjustments via
exit and entry and that globalization can be a driving force of these adjustment processes.
268 Appendix
8.1 Ranking of Elasticities
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2(1￿e)￿(￿) + ￿ (￿) ￿ ￿s
o < 0. (74)
Recall that ￿(￿) = ￿
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. Subtracting (74) from




















8.2 Comparative Statics with Homogeneous Industries
The full equilibrium is described by the following set of equations:
be(X + Y ) = [a ￿ W￿ (￿)](L + kL￿) (76)
2b(1 ￿ e)X = W￿(￿)(L + kL￿) (77)
2b(1 ￿ e)x(i) = [￿ (￿) ￿ ￿ (i)]W (L + kL￿) (78)
b(2 ￿ e)xs = (a ￿ W￿s)(L + kL￿) ￿ beY (79)
Y = mX + nxs + k
L￿
￿￿ (80)
2b(1 ￿ e)L = m(L + kL￿)W￿ (￿) + 2b(1 ￿ e)n￿sxs (81)
27Taking derivatives and rewriting the equations in a matrix format we obtain

















be 1 0 0 be ￿ (￿)
2b(1 ￿ e) ￿￿ 0 0 0 ￿￿(￿)
0 ￿1 1 0 0 ￿(￿ (￿) ￿ ￿ (i))
0 0 0 b(2 ￿ e) be ￿s
￿m 0 0 ￿n 1 0
0 m￿￿0
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The determinant of coe¢ cients j￿j = ￿
b2[2(1￿e)+e￿] is clearly positive: see the explicit expression for ￿ in
footnote 11. Cramer￿ s rule then provides the results presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
8.3 Comparative Statics with Heterogeneous Industries
By taking derivatives of equations (62), (64) and (65) we obtain the following set of equations:
￿mL￿L￿0
￿ (￿L)W￿￿ (￿L)d￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)mH￿H￿0
￿ (￿H)W￿￿ (￿H)d￿H (83)
+
2b(1 ￿ e)L
W (L + kL￿)





























dW = 0, (85)
28where ’H and ’L are de￿ned in the text.
In matrix format, this can be written as:




















































































The determinant of coe¢ cients j￿j = ￿ L
￿
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Figure 6: International Market Integration4
Figure 7: Asymmetric Adjustments in High-Tech and 
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